Resumo

PEREZ OTERO, Manuel. On the Scope of Wittgenstein’s Anti-realism. Anal. filos. [online]. 2020, vol.40, n.2, pp.273-286. ISSN 1851-9636.  http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.337.

Karczmarczyck (2020) evaluates and criticizes some central theses defended in my book Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein en torno al lenguaje y el seguimiento de reglas (2018), centered on the ideas of the second Wittgenstein. I discuss here various points examined by Karczmarczyck. In particular: (i) I reject his anti-realistic conception of intentionality, according to which factors occurring after a given action may determine whether or not it is a deliberate action; (ii) I explore other aspects of the realism/anti-realism contrast, linking them with the anti-realist reading that Kripke, Karczmarczyck and other authors make of Wittgenstein; (iii) I explain why my dispositional-teleological solution to the rule-following puzzle is not circular.

Palavras-chave : Rule-Following; Kripke; Meaning-Scepticism; Realism; Rational Deliberation; Assertability Conditions; Intentionality.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )