Resumo

KARCZMARCZYK, Pedro Diego. Escepticismo semántico, factualismo y antirrealismo. Anal. filos. [online]. 2023, vol.43, n.2, pp.319-343.  Epub 01-Nov-2023. ISSN 1851-9636.  http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e507.

In this paper I take up my discussion with Pérez Otero concerning how to understand Wittgenstein. I defend the thesis that Wittgenstein’s grammatical analysis implies that attributions of understanding and rule-following have a retrospective character, in line with the analysis of the grammar of “capacity”, which attributes “states” to objects on the basis to their effects. I point out that this thesis does not led to an incoherent anti-realistic position, because it is an integral part of the deflationary factualism that we find in the “sceptical solution” proposed by Kripke in his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. In contrast, I point out the inconsistency of positions that attempt to limit their anti-realistic moment to the critique of subjectivist mentalist truth conditions. I analyze the difficulties of this conception in the elucidation of the concept of criterion, showing how a sceptical elucidation of this concept avoids these difficulties.

Palavras-chave : Realism; Deflationary Factualism; Meaning Scepticism; Criterion; Rule-following.

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