versión ISSN 1668-7027
This paper constitutes a theoretical discussion on the transdisciplinary relationships between Logic and Psychology as a way to give an argument for its legitimacy. This is important because such an enterprise may set the trend to develop better and more explicit ways of dealing with fundamental problems that must be attended in setting up a research project or an applied tool that builds upon a connection between related disciplines. As a starting point three types of connection between disciplines that characterize multi, inter and transdiscipline relations are presented. These relations have specific generate knowledge and develop research methods which distinguish them. The specific relation to whom this paper is directed is the relation between Logic and Psychology. Following this point, psychologism is defined as a point of view in which Logic has its origins or can be reduced to a field of Psychology, as such it is considered as a proposal in favor of a relation between Logic and Psychology and is therefore revisited. Then, anti-psychologism, which stands for a position in which Logic doesn't have its origins or cannot be reduced to Psychology, is presented as the response to psychologism. Anti-psychology and Logic and hence the necessity to eliminate such a problem before the shaping of any kind of a relationship between them is discussed. From there on, the paper builds upon the ideas presented by Putman, Beuchot and Dussel to construct an argument that may refute the is / must be distinction understood as the foundation of anti-psychologism. Such ideas are specifically: (a) The fact that no distinction between is / must be can be drawn because they are both conventionally constructed, (b) the idea that must be values aren't artificial or arbitrary, they have their bases of existence on the nature of the way things are, and (c) that in the description of the nature of things there is a certain value load imbedded in to it. Taken as a whole these ideas show that there is a way to build a balance between values and facts, the is / must be distinction, specifically it is build from the notion that in the empirical description of normality, the general or common way that natural processes occur, a cultural set of values may be inferred, but not in a lineal and asymmetric fashion but more likely as a type of pragmatic-dialectic inference that assigns a balance between the two, giving rise to their conventional and mutually constricted nature. Finally, having eliminated the foundation of anti-psychologism the paper continues to describe what may be seen as a shift in the way the relationship between Logic and Psychology is presented. This is done by transforming the vertical discussion from which a reductionist questions are built to a horizontal one in which such questions are replaced by co-elaboration and communication questions. Near the end, the paper presents some notes and examples on the ways in which Logic can solve some internal problems of Psychology, that is: a Logic of Psychology, such as the building of axiomatic models, the use of formal properties as an analog of psychological functions and in the form of a meta-theoretic analysis. The counterpart of this horizontal relationship is the Psychology of Logic which is exemplified by the way in which Psychology may provide knowledge for the constructions of non-monotonic systems and the development of research based teaching tools for Logic. Finally, the paper ends with some themes which may induce future inquiries on the relation between Logic and Psychology, these are: (a) the legitimacy of other type of relations between Logic and Psychology, mainly on the development of no monotonic models, (b) the avoidance of the danger that Logic may become a mathematical recreation, and (c) to continue with a line of work that Kantor stated in 1945.
Palabras llave : Logic; Psychology; Anti-psychologism; Psychologism; Transdisciplinary relationships.