Abstract

CHASQUETTI, Daniel. Parlamento re-activo: De comó partidos poderosos habitan en una legislatura con potestades recortadas. Postdata [online]. 2012, vol.17, n.1. ISSN 1851-9601.

This article examines the institutional features of the Uruguayan Parliament and its particular relationship with a powerful Executive and an institutionalized party system. The thesis argues that the current Parliament's prerogatives arise in the preferences of political parties, which at different junctures reformers chose to design a government system with a powerful Executive branch. This implied the definition of a reactive legislature and a functional habitat for the development of a stable political party cast. In order to demonstrate these statements, the author tooks several empirical tests to assess the consequences of this institutional design, the power exerted by the parties on the legislators' careers, and the degree of influence of the Parliament's reactive activity on initiatives presented by the Executive.

Keywords : Uruguay; Presidentialism; Congresses; Reactive legislatures; Political parties.

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