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Análisis filosófico

versión On-line ISSN 1851-9636


SKIDELSKY, Liza. Realismo intencional, eliminativismo y psicología científica. Anal. filos. [online]. 2003, vol.23, n.1, pp.13-39. ISSN 1851-9636.

The Hairy Intentional Realism (HIR or J. Fodor's Computational/Representational Theory of Mind) aims for two things that I shall try to show are difficult to jointly obtain: states (1) with an interpretable semantic content, and (2) with causal role in the production of behavior. There is no difficulty in obtaining (1), the problem is with (2). HIR's strategy consists in the postulation of causal intentional laws. The problem is that these laws have a doubtful status to the point that many consider them not possible and not even necessary. According to HIR, if (1) and (2) cannot be jointly obtained, two unwanted consequences emerge: if intentional states do not have a causal role qua intentional, that would mean ceasing to be realistic about them; and if intentional laws are not possible that would imply that we could not have a scientific psychology. In the first part of this paper I shall exhibit HIR's main theses and I shall show that it cannot accomplish the two demands. Second, I shall defend the idea that because of the fact that (1) and (2) cannot be reconciled, neither an eliminativism about intentional states, nor the impossibility that psychology is a science can follow.

Palabras clave : Computational models; Propositional attitudes; Causal role; Intentional laws.

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