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Análisis filosófico

On-line version ISSN 1851-9636

Abstract

CASSINI, Alejandro. Confirmación hipotético-deductiva y confirmación bayesiana. Anal. filos. [online]. 2003, vol.23, n.1, pp.41-84. ISSN 1851-9636.

Bayesians often affirm they have produced the best available theory of confirmation. In particular, they claim to have superseded the venerable hypothetico-deductive method. In this paper I intend to assess that claim by making a systematic comparison between both theories of confirmation. I begin by listing the main problems of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. I then show that this conception is incompatible with Hempel's conditions of adequacy for qualitative confirmation. I expound the Bayesian theory of confirmation with some detail in order to show that this theory is able to solve three out of the five fundamental problems of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. largue that the remaining two problems (alternative hypotheses and epistemological holism) are still open questions for the Bayesians.

Keywords : Philosophy of science; Confirmation; Bayesianism.

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