versión On-line ISSN 1851-9636
CASSINI, Alejandro. Confirmación hipotético-deductiva y confirmación bayesiana. Anal. filos. [online]. 2003, vol.23, n.1, pp. 41-84. ISSN 1851-9636.
Bayesians often affirm they have produced the best available theory of confirmation. In particular, they claim to have superseded the venerable hypothetico-deductive method. In this paper I intend to assess that claim by making a systematic comparison between both theories of confirmation. I begin by listing the main problems of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. I then show that this conception is incompatible with Hempel's conditions of adequacy for qualitative confirmation. I expound the Bayesian theory of confirmation with some detail in order to show that this theory is able to solve three out of the five fundamental problems of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. largue that the remaining two problems (alternative hypotheses and epistemological holism) are still open questions for the Bayesians.
Palabras clave : Philosophy of science; Confirmation; Bayesianism.