versión On-line ISSN 1851-9636
HERNANDEZ IGLESIAS, Manuel. La voluntad de no creer. Anal. filos. [online]. 2007, vol.27, n.1, pp. 5-22. ISSN 1851-9636.
Is it rational to believe something because one wants to believe it? Prima facie it is not, for a rational belief is based on reasons, and the will to believe can be a cause, but not a reason for the belief. Nevertheless, some attempts of causally self-inducing beliefs can be viewed as a sort of second-order rationality. This paper sketches a view of this second-order rationality based on Davidson's thesis of the divided mind and Ortega's distinction between ideas and beliefs. The uncomfortable conclusion of the discussion is that the ability to have second-order beliefs about our beliefs is what makes possible both self-criticism and self-improvement and dogmatism and self-corruption and that the possibility condition of rationality and freedom and of irrationality and alienation are the same.
Palabras clave : Rationality; Will; Beliefs; Self-deception; Divided mind.