versión On-line ISSN 1851-9636
VENEZIA, Luciano. Bienes sociales primarios versus utilidad. Anal. filos. [online]. 2007, vol.27, n.2, pp. 185-221. ISSN 1851-9636.
In the present paper I argue that the specific arguments developed by John Rawls to justify the standard of social primary goods do not succeed. In the first place I develop and criticize the Rawlsian arguments grounded in antidiscriminatory intuitions and the fact of reasonable pluralism. I also characterize and criticize Rawls's ideas concerning the scope of the concept of fairness as well as his argument concerning extensive tastes and responsibility for ends. I believe that they do not justify a resourcist distribuendum. On the contrary, I argue that such considerations support a welfarist standard. The reason is that a welfarist standard successfully deals with the difficulties Rawls mentions in favoring the resourcist standard of social primary goods.
Palabras clave : "Justice as fairness"; Social primary goods; Utility; Reasonable pluralism; Fairness.