Resumo

PEREZ, Diana I.. Why should our mind-reading abilities be involved in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness?. Anal. filos. [online]. 2008, vol.28, n.1, pp.35-48. ISSN 1851-9636.

In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.

Palavras-chave : Representationalism; High-order theories of consciousness; Mind-reading abilities.

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