Resumo

FAERNA, Ángel Manuel. Ontología social y derechos humanos en John R. Searle. Anal. filos. [online]. 2011, vol.31, n.2, pp.115-139. ISSN 1851-9636.

This paper challenges the point recently made by John Searle that there are no positive human rights. We contend that the existence of positive human rights is not inconsistent, as Searle argues, with the notions of "right" and "human rights" as defined in his social ontology. Therefore, one could adhere to Searle's social ontology and assert the existence of positive human rights at the same time. Subsequently, the paper gives reason to question the alleged logical priority of social ontology in Searle's sense (i.e., as a purely analytic endeavour) over the particular developments of moral, social, and political philosophy. We suggest, on the contrary, that concerning social reality ontological commitments are dependent on substantive assumptions about the nature and aims of society itself, or else they amount to an empty formalism with no heuristic relevance.

Palavras-chave : Human rights; Social ontology; Searle; Ontological relativity.

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