Resumo

PEREIRA GANDARILLAS, Francisco. Contenido perceptual, conceptos y conciencia fenoménica. Anal. filos. [online]. 2011, vol.31, n.2, pp.165-192. ISSN 1851-9636.

Some supporters of perceptual conceptualism attempt to block the non-conceptualist argument from richness claiming that there is no conscious perception without attention. In order to justify this assertion conceptualists normally appeal to psychological experiments, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. In this paper I will argue that this strategy is insufficient. In addition, I will point out, on the basis of recent theoretical and empirical considerations, that there are good reasons to think that probably there is a form of perceptual phenomenal consciousness beyond the limits of attention that is not cognitively accessible, not to mention conceptually structured.

Palavras-chave : Perception; Conceptual content; Phenomenal consciousness; Attention.

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