Resumo

CEA JACQUES, Ignacio. Causal Closure of the Physical, Neurophysiology and Mental Causes. Anal. filos. [online]. 2019, vol.39, n.2, pp.111-142. ISSN 1851-9636.

In this article, I critically address David Papineau’s assertion that accumulated physiological evidence is sufficient to reasonably adopt the principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical and the via negativa, viz. to understand “physical” as “nonmental”, as a solution to Hempel’s dilemma. We will start lowering the strength of his view by reviewing the work of W. Penfield and J. Eccles, two important neurophysiologists and declared dualists. However, we will then focus on the work of B. Libet in which it is purportedly shown that voluntary movements are really determined by entirely (neuro)physiological causes, which would constitute a fundamental piece of evidence in favour of Papineau. Our analysis will reveal that such conclusions do not follow. This will have negative consequences for the Causal Closure Principle and to the Causal Argument for Physicalism of which the aforementioned principle is a key premise.

Palavras-chave : Causal Argument; Completeness of Physics; Consciousness; Libet; Physicalism.

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