Resumo

YUAN, María Sol. Wittgenstein and the Normativity of Visual Perception. Anal. filos. [online]. 2019, vol.39, n.2, pp.163-190. ISSN 1851-9636.

In the present paper I discuss some normative aspects of perceptual experience by considering Wittgenstein’s contributions to the topic in the Second Part of Philosophical Investigations (PI, II, xi). In these passages, Wittgenstein criticizes the physiological causalist explanations provided by Wolfgang Köhler as well as the representational empiricist view about sensory perception. These considerations allow him to show that interpretation plays a relevant role in certain cases of visual perception (preeminently in cases described as ‘seeing-as’). I propose, first, a way to extend this model to general cases of visual perception of objects generally stated by the expression ‘I see this’. Second, I examine some comparative advantages of this position with respect to its partial alternative, which consists in restricting Wittgenstein’s considerations just for the case of ‘I see it as’.

Palavras-chave : Wittgenstein; Seeing-As; Perception; Normativity; Noticing an Aspect.

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