Abstract

DUTTO, Martín L.  and  BELTRAN, Carlos. Contratación de obra versus concesión de obra pública: Un análisis de los esquemas de incentivos. SaberEs [online]. 2012, vol.4, n.1, pp.00-00. ISSN 1852-4418.

This study analyzes the incentives existing beyond legal contracts of construction works and public work licenses in order to reduce transaction costs.  Legal agreements emerging from moral hazard problems are analyzed. The paper focuses on the mechanisms or clauses which are included in the contracts   regarding the the  "agent" behaves in the way desired by the "principal". Evidence was gathered through case studies of private and public construction work concessions. Preliminary results suggest that, the smaller the firm and consequently,  the bigger its  risk aversion, full fixed-price contract  or price-caps for the concession are mainly avoided. Currently, firms choose  cost-plus contracts- or else contracts regulated by costs in the case of concession of public works . This solution makes possible a more efficient risk sharing, without sacrificing entirely incentives.

Keywords : Incentives; Moral hazard; Construction contracts.

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