Abstract

JUNQUEIRA SMITH, Plínio. Por que Bacon pensa que o ataque cético ao dogmatismo é insuficiente?. Rev. latinoam. filos. [online]. 2012, vol.38, n.1, pp.31-63. ISSN 1852-7353.

There are two mais intepretations concerning Bacon's relation to scepticism in the destructive part of his philosophy. While the traditional one affirms that Bacon didn't pay much attention to scepticism, more recent ones assert that its pars destruens is sceptical. I propose an intermediate interpretation, according to which scepticism is a privileged interlocutor for Bacon to develop his own kind of criticism, but his refusal is not sceptical. In order to defend it, first I examine how Bacon uses the word "scepticism" and its importance throughout his works; then, I offer my criticism of both interpretations; finally, I present an analysis of Bacon's remarks concerning both sceptical propositions "nothing is known" and "nothing can be known", thereby showing many similarities and the crucial differences between Bacon and the sceptics.

Keywords : Scepticism; Bacon; Akatalepsia; Suspension of judgment; Method.

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