Resumo

MELOGNO, Pablo. Epistemology of Information Sciences: a no-foundationalist view. Palabra clave [online]. 2013, vol.2, n.2, pp.11-23. ISSN 1853-9912.

The paper provides an analysis of the scientificity and pretensions of knowledge of information sciences from Richard Rorty's perspective. It presents the Rortyan critique of the epistemologically-centered philosophy, with an emphasis on the presumption that knowledge has some kind of ultimate foundation, and the presumption that philosophy is responsible for clarifying this foundation. It introduces Rorty's proposal of epistemological behaviorism as an alternative to the foundationalism of epistemologically-centered philosophy. Then the paper reviews different stands on the scientific status and epistemic legitimacy of information sciences. Reviewed positions are clustered around two foundation strategies: the inclusion of information sciences in some scientificity model, or their connection with a general philosophical system. The paper states that both strategies assume a foundationalist perspective, as they seek to offer a disciplinary foundation based on an external philosophical framework. Rorty's epistemological behaviorism is opposed to this, stating that the epistemic authority should be explained by the specific contexts of each community, not by an external epistemic foundation

Palavras-chave : Epistemology; Information sciences; Richard Rorty; Foundationalism; Epistemological behaviorism.

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